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In the end, it's not a question of "if" we want to expose those features to the web apps, it's "how" we can do so with minimal risks to the users, and that's where web APIs with thought-out permission models, explicit requests and history of cross-origin checks can help. Few years ago I've been of the same mind about giving the web new powerful features, but after watching the space and seeing the existing alternatives I've come to change my mind.Īs mentioned in another thread below ( ), vendors who need this sort of functionality, already find ways to implement it via other proprietary methods like local executables that, unlike implementations of Web APIs, are not reviewed by other teams and usually expose all sorts of critical stuff over local HTTP servers or in another insecure fashion. I think that's the root of our disagreement. > because it’s such a run-away-screaming scary idea for security The WHATWG Living Standards are a completely different kettle of fish-it’s not a case of even for core stuff, it’s a case of that being a model that makes sense for the well-established core stuff where changes affect many places, given implementation practice (and indeed that’s why browser makers forked HTML, because the W3C development model wasn’t working for them) but the Living Standard approach doesn’t make sense for new stuff and well-isolated functionality, like most CSS and JavaScript APIs. That it is metastable (that’s a more suitable word) in its current state is an indictment against it, not a good thing. WebUSB is not finalised and is not stable, even if it hasn’t changed recently-because the only reason it hasn’t changed is because no one but Chromium is willing to touch it because it’s such a run-away-screaming scary idea for security. How much more in this case, given Mozilla and Apple’s positions on it! It’s extremely likely that if it does get taken onto the standards track it will only be with breaking changes. I have two clear examples in mind, both from IETF rather than W3C, but the principle transfers: Google presented QUIC and Fastmail JMAP to IETF as complete, functional protocols matching what they had been using themselves, but there were some pretty radical changes based on other people’s feedback before each was declared stable. The whole purpose of these standardisation processes is to get multiple parties working on something in order to produce a better result than any one party would achieve. Combined, these facts emphatically mean that it’s not finalised. The spec is not on the standards track at this time, but is in a place where that is the explicit goal (the I in WICG stands for incubation). Speaking frankly here: as the post author and a “WebAssembly Advocadoer you’re speaking from a position where authority will be assumed, but in this comment you expressed some very significant errors and presented a badly biased view. To show this even more clearly, WebSQL was scuttled because everyone used SQLite and there was no satisfactory way of specifying what would be permitted. That multiple browsers use the same engine and implementation is irrelevant for standardisation-otherwise Chromium would be the very definition of the standards. (There’s also an implementation for Node.js, but I think that’s considered irrelevant.) My recollection of the rough processes is that to become a Candidate Recommendation (which is the first stage you could reasonably argue “finalised spec” corresponds to) it would need at least a second shipping implementation, and to be adopted by a working group.Īs it stands, there’s no short-term prospect of a second implementation: Mozilla’s current position is that WebUSB is harmful because it’s super dangerous and the risks can’t be adequately explained, and is a tracking hazard, and WebKit have likewise consciously decided not to implement WebUSB for similar reasons (“due to fingerprinting, security, and other concerns, and where we do not yet see a path to resolving those concerns”). It’s a WICG draft (draft means not finalised, and WICG means explicitly unofficial), with only one shipping implementation in browsers.